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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not a causal relationship can be 
established between access to credit and enterprise productivity. The empirical work is based 
on a survey of small scale enterprises in Ecuador. The study analyzed firms in a liquidity 
constraint framework, and found that credit may be important in explaining enterprise 
productivity when it relaxes a binding liquidity constraint. However, it is not clear that liquidity 
is the key element affecting flrm productivity. There is strong evidence indicating the 
importance of the sub-sector variable in explaining a firm's total productivity. 
LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS AND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF 
SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISES IN ECUADOR 
by 
Narda L. Sotomayor, Richard L. Meyer, and Carlos E. Cuevas 
I. Introduction 
The economic arguments made in favor of small scale enterprises (SSE), the perception 
of problems in small borrower access to credit, and the belief that credit will help facilitate the 
adoption of new techniques have justified the creation of special financial programs in many 
developing countries to support the development of SSE. The past few years have witnessed a 
rapid proliferation of organizations and institutions supporting SSE in Ecuador. 
This emphasis on credit is reminiscent of the large body of literature that has analyzed 
the failure of small farm credit programs (for example, Gonzalez-Vega, Adams and Graham). 
The microenterprise credit programs of today resemble those earlier attempts to assist small 
farms. Both types of programs involve similar assumptions and utilize the same type of project 
justification; therefore, both are likely to encounter similar problems (Adams and Von Pischke). 
If the credit programs do not accomplish one of their most important objectives, that of 
improving a firm's efficiency, there will be a waste of resources which implies a cost for 
society. Therefore, for sound policymaking it is important to analyze the relationship between 
the granting of credit and the performance of small scale enterprises. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first purpose is to measure the economic 
performance of small scale enterprises in Ecuador. The second is to test if the variability in 
economic performance across small-scale enterprises and subsectors is influenced by their 
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liquidity position. If it can be shown that liquidity affects performance, then it is possible that 
improving access to credit will improve a finn's output and performance. 
The empirical analysis for this paper is based on a survey of SSEs conducted in Ecuador 
in 1990. The paper is organized as follows. Following this introduction, the next section briefly 
discusses the importance of SSEs in the Ecuadorian economy. The theoretical framework used 
in this study is then presented in section three. It is followed by a summary of the methodology 
used for empirically testing the relationship between liquidity and finn performance. The empir-
ical results are then presented followed by the last section that summarizes the main conclusions 
and policy implications. 
II. Small Scale Enterprises in the Ecuadorian Economy 
Small scale enterprises play a critical role in the Ecuadorian economy. In the late 1980s 
the number of micro and small scale firms in the country was estimated to be 250,000 to 
350,000. While the majority were unregistered, a substantial number were either registered or 
were in the process of being formalized. Small scale fmns represented the source of employ-
ment for nearly half of the economically active population in urban areas (Blayney). 
The SSEs often face serious problems of production, management, and marketing. In 
addition, external factors including access to markets and the nature of the environment in which 
they conduct their activities are also important impediments for the SSEs. Low productivities 
and inefficiencies are the frequent results of these problems. 
In recognition of the importance of small scale enterprises and their several problems, 
various special fmancing programs have been established in Ecuador. Private banks, public sec-
tor institutions, non- governmental organizations (NGOs), and membership organizations have 
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begun to offer diverse services to small firms. An assumption frequently held by SSE support 
programs is that credit is needed to finance intermediate inputs or fixed capital. Credit, there-
fore, is regarded as a crucial determinant for increasing SSE productivity. There is little empiri-
cal evidence, however, that demonstrates that increased borrowing by SSEs has resulted in high-
er productivity. Therefore, it is important to determine if credit is effectively a binding con-
straint for small scale Ecuadorian enterprises, and if relaxing this constraint would likely gener-
ate important improvements in economic performance. 
ill. Conceptual Approach 
A. Theoretical Framework 
Because incomes and expenditures are not perfectly synchronized, enterprises and house-
holds often face short term liquidity shortages. Credit can be an important means to cover im-
balances in cash inflows and outflows. Credit is not directly a factor of production itself, but 
it can contribute to increases in production and productivity when it facilitates the purchase and 
use of factors of production without requiring immediate payment. Because of fungibility prob-
lems, however, it cannot be concluded that the increased availability of credit will necessarily 
be followed by increased production and productivity. This makes it methodologically incorrect 
to directly put credit into a production function to analyze the production and productivity effects 
of access to increased liquidity (David and Meyer). 
In an attempt to quantify the impact of credit, some studies have estimated separate pro-
duction functions for groups of borrowers and non-borrowers assuming they were homogeneous 
in all other respects. However, differences observed across groups may reflect the "cause" as 
well as the "effect" of participation in credit markets. Furthermore, modeling policies by 
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including a discrete participation indicator which denotes receipt of some particular loan package 
may produce misleading results if the actual characteristics of the loans granted ignore the pack-
age. Information on loan sizes also does not provide convincing evidence because a given loan 
size may be too small or too large depending on the particular liquidity needs of the enterprise. 
Furthermore, many non-borrowers do not borrow by choice; that is, they do not even apply for 
a loan because they have sufficient liquidity from their own resources. Some others, however, 
cannot borrow because they are not creditworthy (Feder et al.). Therefore, if the purpose is to 
analyze the impact of credit, it is not enough to distinguish between borrowers and nonbor-
rowers, or even to consider size of loans granted. 
Another problem for cases in which owners operate small businesses is that their house-
hold accounts often overlap their business finances. Therefore, credit demand is affected by 
both consumption and production. An appropriate framework for evaluating credit impact, 
therefore, must integrate both business and household accounts. 
In a household model framework, a household head allocates family and external 
resources at her/his disposal at the beginning of the production period to the following uses: 
current consumption, investment, and current production (Feder et al.). Households maximize 
a utility function subject to a budget or liquidity constraint, which requires that the amount of 
liquid resources --initial family wealth (Wo) plus loans (L)-- equal expenditures on current 
consumption (Co), hired labor (H) at the wage rate (w), and investment (I). Therefore, 
W + L = C + wH +I 0 0 (1) 
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If the owners of enterprises can borrow as much as they want at current interest rates, 
liquidity is not a binding constraint and production decisions will be independent from consump-
tion decisions (Singh, Squire, and Strauss). However, this seldom occurs. For microentrepre-
neurs in particular, risk, information problems, and high transaction costs involved in lending 
to small borrowers imply that credit rationing will likely occur and liquidity will be a binding 
constraint. If this occurs, decisions about family consumption and production are not indepen-
dent. Given a particular liquidity endowment, assigning a certain amount of liquidity to produc-
tion purposes is equivalent to reducing consumption in an equal amount, and vice versa. 
Increasing the availability of credit for households facing a binding liquidity constraint will imply 
an increase in consumption and/or in production (Feder et al.). Thus, to capture the complete 
effect of relaxing the liquidity constraint requires detailed information about household expenses. 
Unfortunately, such information is not available to us for the Ecuadorian firms analyzed, so this 
study is restricted to production analysis. 
To facilitate the analysis, assume that only two factors are needed for production: 
physical capital (K), which is ftxed in the short run at level Ko, and labor (N), which includes 
family and hired labor. Both types of labor can vary and are part of production costs. There-
fore, the profit maximization problem facing the entrepreneur in the short run can be written as: 
Max B = P.F(K0 N) - (r.Ko +w.N) 
N 
(2) 
where B denotes benefits (or profits), P is the output price, F is the production function, and r 
and w are the prices of each unit of capital and labor, respectively. 
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The first order condition in the absence of a liquidity constraint is: 
a(F(K,N) 
aN 
w 
p 
(3) 
Knowing the shape of the production function, we can solve for the optimum use of the variable 
inputs and for the level of output. The corresponding optimal solution can be denoted byE*= 
(N*, Y*), which is shown in Figure 1. Now incorporate a liquidity constraint that requires that 
the expenses for production inputs do not exceed the liquidity available for production, i.e.: 
(4) 
where Lp is the amount of liquidity which will be used to pay for the current period's purchased 
inputs that the entrepreneur has allocated for the business. N is the number of full time 
equivalent workers, and w and r are the prices of labor and capital, respectively .1 
Three alternative cases could exist: first, the liquidity constraint is not binding and Lp 
exceeds the optimal cost of production; second, Lp exactly covers the costs of production; and 
finally, Lp is less than the optimal cost of production, that is, liquidity is a binding constraint. 
In the presence of a liquidity constraint (see figure 1), the first order conditions are: 
aF(K0 ,N) W 
= (1 +y)(-p) 
aN 
(5) 
1 Alternatively, two types of workers could be distinguished: hired labor and family labor 
differing in their pressure for liquidity. Hired labor requires payment in cash, while family 
members are more flexible. This variation, however, does not significantly change the analysis. 
It is equivalent to relaxing the liquidity constraint by the amount of wages assigned to family 
members. 
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L = rK +wN 0 0 (6) 
where 'Y is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first order conditions show that when 'Y > 0, the 
marginal productivity of labor is no longer equal to the real price of labor and E* is not feasible. 
In Figure 1, the new sub-optimal solution is denoted by (N +, Y +), where N + and Y + are 
smaller than N* and Y*, respectively. 
If the entrepreneur is granted a loan L0 , the amount of liquidity assigned for productive 
purposes (Lp) will not always increase. If households are facing a binding liquidity constraint, 
loans granted for production might be spent for consumption. Thus, the increase in Lp --oLp--
can vary between zero and the size of the loan, i.e.: 
If credit is allocated for productive purposes, the sub-optimal solution--with a liquidity 
constraint--might be affected in at least three ways. First, depending upon the loan size and its 
use in production, credit might permit the producer to approach or reach the optimal short run 
production solution. Second, the credit might allow the entrepreneur to obtain a more remunera-
tive input combination. This gain might occur because of the use of higher quality inputs, which 
implies either an increase in the quantity or an improvement in the quality of output produced. 
Finally, a third credit effect could occur in the long run if the credit permitted the purchase of 
a new technological package, which in the absence of credit might not be feasible for the entre-
preneur. This package might consist of new equipment or a new technological process. 
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It is clear, therefore, that the impact of credit in terms of improving production and 
productivity depends on the extent to which a loan succeeds in relaxing a binding liquidity 
constraint on production. 
IV. The Measurement of Enterprise Economic Performance 
The empirical challenge of this research was to measure the economic performance of 
the enterprises interviewed given the limited existing data, and to test if economic performance 
was linked to access to liquidity. The indicator chosen for this purpose was the private benefit 
cost ratio (PBC). The PBC relates the value added of an enterprise to the total cost of all 
resources used in the production process. Output and inputs are both valued at market prices. 2 
The PBC is a total economic efficiency measure as it captures the enterprises' price and technical 
efficiency. 
The formula for the PBC ratio can be written as follows: 
where, 
VA 
r 
PBC = _V.:_:4_ 
(wL+rK) 
(7) 
value added obtained by subtracting the cost of raw materials used from the value 
of total output, 
weighted average of interest rates representing the enterprises's various sources 
of capital, including own capital, 
2 While the PBC ratio captures the private point of view, other measures, such as the social 
benefit cost ratio (SBC), concern the average payoff of the frrm's use of resources from the 
point of view of the society as a whole. 
w 
K 
L 
= 
= 
= 
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average wage rate including the opportunity cost of the entrepreneurs own family 
labor, and that of his family, 
enterprise's total fixed and working capital, and 
total number of full time workers including family labor. 
The PBC ratio cannot directly capture the fact that the entrepreneur may be facing a 
binding liquidity constraint. The approach used in this study, therefore, was to analyze and 
compare indicators of the value added from an endowment of capital and labor across groups 
of liquidity constrained and non-constrained entrepreneurs. In this way, the differences in 
efficiency may be explained by the missing variable in the PBC formula, namely the liquidity 
situation of the entrepreneur. 
Based on the theoretical framework presented above, it can be shown that the liquidity 
constrained group of enterprises is expected to have a lower PBC ratio than the non-constrained 
group. In addition, other characteristics besides credit constraints that might explain differences 
in productive efficiency are explored using a regression model. These include capital-labor 
ratio, subsector or specific economic activity, location of enterprise, size of enterprise, and 
gender and level of education of the owner. 
V. Empirical Framework 
A. Data 
The empirical analysis was based on a survey of 582 micro and small entrepreneurs 
conducted in Ecuador in 1990.3 The sample was selected randomly from among participants 
of the major SSE support programs - nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) supported by 
3 For a complete description of the sample refer to Magill. 
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international donor projects, private foundations, private banks and the national development 
bank. The final sample included 430 beneficiaries and 152 non-beneficiaries. 4 Non-
beneficiaries were selected from among nearby firms that were of similar types but did not 
participate in any program. 
Two selection criteria were used to select from the total survey those observations used 
in this study. First, since this study focuses on production, firms involved in commerce and 
service activities were excluded. Secondly, firms were limited to those with less than 10 full 
time workers.5 The sub-sample that resulted from applying these selection criteria included 236 
observations. 
The responses given by the entrepreneurs were used as evidence to determine the extent 
to which a firm was liquidity constrained. The survey asked the entrepreneurs about their 
perceptions concerning diverse problems affecting their businesses.6 Of the 14 questions related 
to different problems faced by the entrepreneur, responses were chosen for analysis concerning 
working capital and capital for fixed assets. The respondents reported the degree to which a 
particular problem affected the performance of the enterprise as being: (a) a serious problem, 
4 The beneficiaries were defined as individuals who had received some form of assistance -
credit, training or technical assistance- from one of the special SSE programs. 
5 The concept of small scale enterprise is somewhat arbitrary. Various definitions are found 
in the literature. The definition using size as a criterion is most frequently used, and it is 
usually based on number of workers and/or value of fixed assets. The criterion of number of 
workers is assumed because it is the "least objectionable" and relatively easy to measure 
accurately (Liedholm and Mead, p. 3). 
6 The approach of using producers' perceptions about constraints has been used by various 
authors such as Feder et al. and Levy. The Feder et al. study analyzed borrowing households 
to determine the extent to which the supply of formal credit was a constraint for desired 
activities. Levy's study is based on firm level interviews to learn what the small and medium 
enterprises viewed as major constraints on enterprise operation and expansion. 
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(b) not a serious problem, (c) not a problem at all, and (d) does not know. An entrepreneur was 
defined as being liquidity constrained only if working or fixed asset capital were reported to be 
a "serious problem." An entrepreneur was considered to not face a binding liquidity constraint 
if the response was "not a serious problem" or "not a problem at all." Using this system, 134 
of the 236 entrepreneurs were classified as liquidity-constrained. 
B. Model Specification 
Based on the theoretical framework, the following model was estimated using the 
ordinary least squares method: 
(8) 
where PBC is the private benefit cost ratio; K/L is the capital-labor ratio, K is the firm's total 
fixed capital (valued at its current market prices), and N is the total number of workers. 
Further, EDUi, LOCj, SPAk, SIZ~ and GEND are qualitative variables which capture the 
entrepreneur's level of education, the location of the SSE, the sector of economic activity of the 
firm, the size of the firm, and the gender of the entrepreneur, respectively. 7 AGE refers to the 
age of the enterprise in number of years. Finally, CONS is a binary variable with a value of 
1 when the observation was defmed as being liquidity constrained and 0 when the observation 
was defmed as not constrained by liquidity. Before incorporating the CONS variable into the 
model, the Chow test was applied and the null hypothesis that the model parameters are the same 
for both liquidity constrained and unconstrained groups was rejected . 
7 See appendix for a more detailed defmition of the variables. 
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Therefore, the model was estimated in the form: 
(9) 
where Xi denotes the independent variables already defined. Specified in this way, the model 
permits both the intercept and the slope coefficients to differ between the two groups. 
The value added (VA) of the firm was defmed as total monthly sales less the cost of raw 
materials and intermediate goods. Since no information was reported in the survey about the 
total cost of raw materials, VA was estimated at 30 percent of the monthly sales. 8 The problem 
with having to use this estimation procedure is that it is not possible to capture the differences 
among enterprises in value added due to the use of different capital intensities. However, 
selecting only enterprises with no more than 10 workers reduces the possibility of a wide range 
in scale of operations. 
The total wages paid to hired labor, plus an implicit wage assigned to the entrepreneur's 
family members and the opportunity cost of the owner's time, are represented by wL. 9 This 
rate was calculated from the average total cost for hired labor reported in the survey. The same 
wage rate was assigned to both family labor and hired labor assuming that they are equally 
qualified. The opportunity cost of the entrepreneur's time was estimated by using the minimum 
8 Magill et al. used 70 percent of total sales as an estimate of the value of raw materials. 
For the purpose of comparing different PBC ratios, assuming a fixed percentage of total sales 
to estimate VA will give the same result as when assuming total sales as an estimator of VA. 
However, using 70 percent of total sales gives a better estimate of the correct absolute value of 
PBC. 
9 Lis the number full-time workers. A part-time worker was considered as one-half of a 
full-time worker. 
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monthly income paid to employees in large firms in the year of the survey. 10 This estimation 
is used because about 84 percent of the entrepreneurs reported having previous work experience 
and 38 percent reported having worked in a wage earning position in a private company. 
The total cost of capital is represented by rK where r is the average interest rate 
corresponding to alternative uses of capital. This value was estimated as an average interest rate 
that is between the commercial interest rate charged on loans and the interest rate paid on 
savings. 11 The total capital represents the value of total assets as estimated by the entrepreneur. 
VI. Results 
A. Enterprise Efficiency 
The average PBC value for the enterprises included in the analysis was less than 1 at 
0. 86. There was a wide range of PBC values, however, as shown by the coefficient of variation 
of 1.15. The average PBC values for the various subsectors were also less than 1, except for 
food products (1.08) and the basic products sub-sectors (1.05). PBC values less than 1 imply 
that the payments to the total factors of production exceed the values they generated in the 
production process. Obviously, enterprises cannot continue to operate in this situation for the 
long term. 
These apparently negative results contrast with the entrepreneurs' positive perceptions 
about their businesses. They were surprisingly optimistic considering the economic crisis in the 
10 A total income of $./45,000 (52.33 U.S. dollars) per month was estimated based on the 
minimum wage of $./32,000 per month. 
11 In 1990, the commercial interest rates were 45 percent per year for deposits and 54 
percent for loans. The simple average of these rates was 49 percent per year, which is 
equivalent to a monthly compounded interest rate of 3.38 percent. 
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Ecuadorian economy at the time the survey was taken. Nearly 60 percent of the entrepreneurs 
reported to be "satisfied" with their businesses and 13 percent were "very satisfied". 
Furthermore, when asked about their future plans, 90 percent said they will continue in their 
business and expand it. These results lead to the questions of what explains this discrepancy 
between the low PBC values found in the study and the entrepreneurs' positive perceptions about 
their own businesses, and how can these small scale firms continue to exist with these low 
returns? 
One possible explanation for these observations is that the entrepreneurs were overly 
positive in their responses in order to appear creditworthy to the SSE supporting institutions. 
A second explanation is that a self-selection process is at work in which entrepreneurs with 
optimistic views are attracted to special support programs for small firms. A third possibility 
is that the measurement procedures used overestimated the opportunity cost of resources or 
underestimated the value added, or both. 12 Of course, as long as the firms cover their variable 
costs, those with an unsatisfactory performance in the year of the survey may continue to operate 
in the market expecting to do better in the future. 
B. Model Results 
The main results of the regression model are reported in Table 1. The R2 coefficient and 
the F statistic suggest that the model provides a fairly good fit. The value of the F statistic is 
significant at the 5 percent level, implying that the overall model is significant in explaining the 
total productivity of the firms surveyed. 
12 A more extensive discussion of the discrepancy between PBC values and entrepreneurs' 
perception is offered by Sotomayor. 
16 
The capital-labor ratio (KIL), which is often used as an indicator of the level of 
mechanization of a finn, was a highly significant variable. The value of the parameter is 
negative, however, and close to zero. This result supports the idea that relatively more labor 
intensive flnns have a better performance than more capital intensive ones. Labor may be 
cheaper in small scale enterprises relative to capital because income is shared among family 
members so they value the opportunity cost of their time at a low level. The result found for 
the K/L ratio is independent of the fact that the firm may be facing a liquidity constraint as 
shown by the insignificance of the variable for K/L *CONS. 
Neither of the SIZE variables was statistically significant over the size range included in 
this study. In fact, there is no consensus in the literature with respect to how economic 
efficiency varies with the size of the enterprise. In some cases, small enterprises appear to be 
technically inefficient compared to medium and large ones. It is argued that technological or 
managerial economies of scale may permit larger firms to operate with lower production costs 
than their smaller counterparts, and thus appear to be more efficient (Cortes et al.). On the 
other hand, SSEs may appear more efficient because they employ cheaper hired labor and 
because the owners may underestimate the cost of their labor and that of their family. These 
factors may not have been observed in this sample because the range in enterprise size was 
comparatively small. 
It is often expected that the level of formal education of the entrepreneur would have a 
positive effect on finn efficiency because it would improve the entrepreneur's management and 
ability to perceive and take advantage of economic opportunities. However, the results for the 
education variables showed that formal education had little impact on business performance. 
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Perhaps non-formal education or training in Ecuador provides better preparation for the small 
scale entrepreneur than does formal education. 
The gender variable was not statistically significant in explaining enterprise performance; 
therefore, a female entrepreneur is as likely to have a high/low PBC ratio as a male. Further, 
there was no statistically significant interaction between gender and liquidity constraint. This 
result was not expected because it is often argued in the literature that poor women have limited 
access to formal credit sources (for example, Berger, Buvinic) and this constrains their 
productivity (Blumberg). This study did not support this argument. 
The parameters of the economic sub-sector variables were negative and statistically 
significant in explaining a firm's PBC ratio. This implies that the specific sub-sector in which 
the entrepreneur operates affects the performance of the enterprise. Furthermore, enterprises 
engaged in the food products subsector, which was used as the base, appear to have a better 
performance than those engaged in any other sector. As expected, enterprises engaged in 
activities that do not require sophisticated technology and that are intensive in the use of 
domestic inputs, such as food processing, appear to have a better performance than other firms. 
The parameters for geographic region were not statistically significant. Similarly, the 
variable for AGE of enterprise was not statically significant when introduced alone into the 
model. The AGE variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, however, when it 
interacts with the liquidity situation of the entrepreneur (CONS variable). This result implies 
that age matters in explaining firm performance if the finn is constrained by liquidity. Two 
alternative effects of age of the firm are discussed in the literature. First, older firms may have 
more experience so they may have better performance (Chuta and Liedholm). Second, younger 
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firms, entering later into the market, may benefit from technological progress so they may have 
better performance (Little et al.). If the two effects were present in the liquidity constrained 
group of firms, it seems that the experience effect prevailed. In the presence of a binding 
liquidity constraint, firms can not take advantage of relatively more sophisticated equipment, so 
the experience effect swamps the technological effect. In the case of liquidity unconstrained 
firms, no conclusions can be drawn because the parameter was not statistically significant. 
C. Liquidity Constraint and Enterprise Performance 
As shown in Table 1, the variable capturing the entrepreneurs' liquidity situation (CONS) 
is significant at the 1 percent level, and has the expected negative sign. To facilitate the analysis 
of the liquidity variable, enterprises with equal characteristics but differing in their liquidity 
situation were grouped together. With the CONS variable taking values 0 and 1, firms were 
classified by their liquidity situation. Firms with equal characteristics were group together, 
according to the following formula: 
PBC = a + ~AAge + y A(K/L) + oDi (10) 
where the average value of the firm's age (AAge) and the average value of the capital-labor ratio 
(A(K/L)) were kept fixed while the other dichotomous variables (Di) were allowed to vary. 
Only statistically significant variables were used in the grouping procedure. The parameters a, 
{3, 'Y, and o for each group of liquidity constrained and unconstrained firms can be calculated 
from the results shown in Table 1. The results of the above procedure are reported in Table 2, 
with their corresponding average PBC ratios. 
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Out of the fourteen groups, nine had the expected result that firms with a binding 
liquidity constraint have a lower PBC ratio than unconstrained firms. Firms engaged in the 
subsectors of textiles and clothing, shoes and leather, and basic products had the opposite result. 
The effect of the liquidity constraint is not homogeneous among groups. The increase 
in PBC values going from constrained to unconstrained firms is higher in some cases than in 
others. For instance, for group 1, the percentage change in PBC when a constrained firm 
becomes unconstrained is about 65 percent, while for group 4 the change is over 300 percent. 
Cases 1 through 8 include firms with the same characteristics but they differ by sub-sector of 
economic activity. A comparison of the percent change in PBC provides an indication of the 
relative importance of relaxing the liquidity constraint for fmns across the sub-sectors. 
As noted, textiles and clothing, shoes and leather, and basic product fmns, are subsectors 
which showed a negative relation between liquidity and relative efficiency. This result 
contradicts economic theory and a reasonable explanation can not be provided. Our inability to 
include consumption in the model may offer one explanation. Entrepreneurs that reported no 
liquidity constraint in production may be diverting funds from their businesses to their 
households. 
The results reported in Table 2 suggest that it is important to analyze sub-sectors 
irrespective of liquidity situation. By comparing groups 1 through 7, for example, food 
processing is generally associated with higher PBC ratios. This observation raises the question 
about whether or not liquidity should be the key issue of concern regarding small scale fmns. 
To illustrate this point, consider the liquidity-constrained fmns in group 4 which include 
woodworking fmns. Relaxing their liquidity constraint would generate an increase of over 300 
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percent in their PBC ratios as shown in the top panel of Table 1. However, a switch of these 
constrained woodworking firms to the food processing sub-sector, without changing their 
liquidity situation, implies an even greater 370 percent increase in their PBC ratio. This 
situation occurs for almost half of the cases in the study. Furthermore, for the liquidity 
constrained flnns whose performance deteriorates when shifting to the unconstrained situation, 
shifting into the food products sub-sector can improve their PBC. This is true for all the cases 
except the basic products flnns (which cannot be improved by either relaxing their liquidity 
situation or moving to another sub-sector). Therefore, it appears that sub-sector is as important 
or more so than the firm's liquidity situation in explaining the PBC ratio. 
These results show that the entrepreneur's liquidity situation and the sub-sector in which 
the finn operates are important factors in explaining a firm's performance. Furthermore, the 
importance of liquidity varies across sub-sector of economic activity. It cannot be concluded, 
however, that credit programs will be successful in improving the efficiency of all firms because 
of perverse effects found in some cases when the liquidity constraint was relaxed. Moreover, 
even in the cases where a positive relation between liquidity and efficiency was found, an 
increase in total efficiency is not always guaranteed with improvements in liquidity. 
Vll. Conclusions and Implications 
The empirical fmdings of this study generally seem to support the main hypothesis 
concerning liquidity and enterprise performance. Small scale firms that do not face a binding 
liquidity constraint were estimated to have a better performance than those that do, ceteris 
paribus. Due to fungibility problems, however, it is not possible to guarantee that improved 
access to credit programs will improve the production and efficiency of enterprises. To observe 
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a positive effect on total efficiency, a necessary but not sufficient condition is that credit must 
relax a binding liquidity constraint. Simply providing increased access to credit is not enough. 
It is necessary to discriminate between entrepreneurs with different liquidity situations if the 
provision of liquidity is to be efficient. 
From the coefficients estimated in the regression model, some conclusions can be drawn. 
First, the small but negative value of the capital-labor ratio coefficient suggests that there is no 
conflict, at least in the static sense, between efficiency and labor intensity. Labor intensive firms 
may reach higher levels of relative efficiency than relatively capital intensive firms. Second, 
the entrepreneur's education has little impact on business performance. Third, the gender 
variable was not statistically significant in explaining a firm's performance. Furthermore, there 
was no statistically significant interaction between gender and liquidity. Fourth, geographic 
location did not appear to explain differences of PBC values among enterprises. On the other 
hand, the age of the firm was found to be significant when the liquidity constraint was binding, 
but the parameter estimated was small. 
Finally, but most interesting, among all the variables studied, the sub-sector of economic 
activity seems to be the most important variable in explaining a firm's performance. The results 
imply that small firms have comparative advantages in some types of economic activity. This 
result is likely due to natural advantages in producing certain goods, and by different economic 
environments and circumstances that face different industries. The sub-sector variable also 
interacts with the liquidity constraint variable. Some sub-sectors are more sensitive to liquidity 
shortages than others. 
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Two conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, in view of the strong evidence 
indicatmg the importance of sub-sector in explaining a firm's total efficiency, it is possible that 
the policymaker's concern for credit is overemphasized. In several cases, the specific economic 
activity in which the firm is engaged appears to be more important than liquidity in explaining 
performance. Greater benefits may be obtained from policy measures that help identify and 
promote those sub-sectors with natural comparative advantages. Furthermore, mechanisms to 
encourage entrepreneurs to abandon uncompetitive subsectors would appear to be important. 
The second conclusion is that once the relevant sub-sectors are defmed, credit assistance should 
be directed to those firms for which the relative importance of liquidity is significant. 
A number of issues need to be clarified in future research on SSEs. First, further testing 
is needed to determine if the differences among subsectors found here are consistent over time 
and if the ranking of efficiency estimates is fairly consistent from one year to the next. Second, 
surveys of SSEs that are designed to study fmancial constraints need to employ an integrated 
production and consumption framework because of the difficulty in separating business and 
household uses of liquidity. In this regard, SSEs are similar to small family farms in which 
farm and household fmances are completely co-mingled. It is conceptually incorrect to assume 
that small scale entrepreneurs will necessarily allocate increased liquidity provided by loans to 
improving the output and efficiency of their businesses. Finally, caution is needed in 
generalizing from these results to all SSEs. The enterprises included in this survey could be 
unique because they represent those that chose to participate in and were accepted by special 
programs in Ecuador. 
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TABLE 1 
OLS MODEL RESULTS 
variable estimate t test variable estimate t test 
constant 2.40 7.54* 
K/L -0.56E-07 -2.01 ** K/L*CONS -0.61E-07 -1.45 
SIZE2 -0.18 -1.01 SIZE2*CONS -0.13 -0.59 
SIZE3 -0.03 -0.18 SIZE3*CONS -0.16 -0.62 
EDU2 -0.30 -1.64*** EDU2*CONS 0.27 1.23 
EDU3 -0.15 0.47 EDU3*CONS -0.22 -0.53 
GEND -0.05 -0.36 GEND*CONS 0.01 0.05 
SPA2 -1.14 -5.87* SPA2*CONS 0.92 2.34* 
SPA3 -1.36 -6.34* SPA3*CONS 1.22 2.93* 
SPA4 -1.01 -3.23* SPA4*CONS 0.56 1.24 
SPAS -0.96 -2.54* SPA5*CONS 1.19 1.64*** 
SPA6 -0.64 -1.79*** SPA6*CONS 0.57 1.09 
SPA7 -0.66 -2.12* SPA7*CONS 0.38 0.79 
LOCQ -0.19 -0.53 LOCQ*CONS 0.22 0.57 
LOCG 0.03 0.11 LOCG*CONS 0.18 0.51 
LOCC -0.18 -1.19 LOCC*CONS 0.33 1.51 
AGE -0.04 -1.45 AGE*CONS 0.06 2.02** 
CONS -1.27 -2.71 * 
N 236 
Rz 0.79 
FTEST 18.29* 
* significant at 1 percent level 
** significant at 5 percent level 
*** significant at 10 percent 
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TABLE 2 
PBC RATIOS BY GROUPS OF LIQUIDITY -CONSTRAINED AND UNCONSTRAINED 
ENTREPRENEURS 
Group Sub-sector of Activity Liquidity Liquidity Percentage 
Constrained ( 1) Unconstrained Change 
(2) {(1)/(2)}-1 
Group 11 
1 food products 1.28 2.11 64.84 
2 textiles and clothing 1.06 0.97 -8.50 
3 shoes and leather 1.13 0.74 -0.34 
4 woodworking 0.27 1.10 307.41 
5 basic products 1.52 1.15 -24.34 
6 metalworking 0.64 1.47 129.69 
7 jewelry and handicraft 0.62 1.44 132.26 
Group 112 
1 food products 0.98 1.81 84.69 
2 textiles and clothing 0.76 0.67 -11.84 
3 shoes and leather 0.83 0.44 -46.99 
4 woodworking 0.00 0.80 n.a. 
5 basic products 1.22 0.85 -30.33 
6 metalworking 0.34 1.17 244.12 
7 jewelry and handicraft 0.32 1.14 256.25 
Group I includes firms headed by entrepreneurs who completed at most elementary 
school education. 
2 Group II includes firms headed by entrepreneurs with education beyond elementary 
school but no higher than high school. 
APPENDIX 
Definition of Variables 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
K/L CAPITAL LABOR RATIO 
EDU1 EDUCATION OF THE ENTREPRENEUR 
dummy variable EDU1 = 1 primary school degree (base variable). 
EDUI = [0,1] EDU2 = 1 higher than primary school but less or equal to 
secondary school 
EDU3 = 1 higher than secondary school 
EDU1 = 0 otherwise 
LOCJ LOCATION OF THE ENTERPRISE 
dummy variable LOC1 = 1 Sierra region (base variable) 
LOCJ = [0,1] LOC2 = 1 Quito 
LOC3 = 1 Guayaquil 
LOC4 = 1 Coastal region 
LOCJ = 0 otherwise 
SPAk SPECIFIC ACTIVITY 
dummy variable SPA1 = 1 food products (base variable) 
SPAk = [0,1] SP A2 = 1 textiles and clothing 
SP A3 = 1 shoes and leather 
SP~ = 1 woodworking, carpentry and upholstery 
SPA5 = 1 basic products: paper products, chemical products and 
basic metals 
SP~ = 1 metalworking 
SP A7 = 1 jewelry and handicrafts 
SP A8 = 0 otherwise 
SIZE1 SIZE OF THE ENTERPRISE (number of full-time workers crit 
dummy variable erio 
SIZE1 = [0, 1] n) 
SIZE1 = 1 less than 1 worker 
SIZ~ = 1 more than one but less than 5 workers 
SIZ~ = 1 more than 5 but less or equal to 10 workers 
SIZ~ = 0 otherwise 
AGE AGE OF THE ENTERPRISE (in years) 
GEND ENTREPRENEUR'S GENDER 
dummy variable GEND = 1 female 
GEND = [0,1] 
CONS LIQUIDITY SITUATION 
dummy variable CONS = 1 binding liquidity constraint 
CONS = [0,1] 
Xi. CONS INTERACTION VARIABLES 
dummy variable Xi. CONS = 1 if Xi=1 and CONS=l 
Xi . CONS = [0, 1] 
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